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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-11119-RGS
JOACHIM MARTILLO
v.
TWITTER INC., et al.
ORDER
October 15, 2021
STEARNS, D.J.
Pro se litigant Joachim Martillo brings this action in which he alleges
that he has wrongfully been prohibited from making statements on certain
social media platforms. Martillo has filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the
motion and dismiss this action.
I.

Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Upon review of Martillo’s motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, the court concludes that he has adequately shown that he is unable
to prepay the filing fee. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.
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II.

Review of the Complaint
Because Martillo is proceeding in forma pauperis, his pleading is

subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). This statute authorizes
federal courts to dismiss actions in which a plaintiff seeks to proceed without
prepayment of fees if the action is malicious, frivolous, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In
conducting this review, the court liberally construes Martillo’s pleading
because he is proceeding pro se. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972).
Martillo brings this action against six private companies that operate
social media platforms. Martillo, who self-identifies as a Diaspora Jew,
claims that these companies discriminate against “Palestinians, Arabs,
Muslims, and Diaspora Jews that reject Zionism.” Compl. ¶ 36. Martillo
represents that each defendant disabled or suspended his account on their
respective platforms because he posted content that each defendant deemed
to be anti-Zionist. These alleged events occurred in 2019 and 2020.
Martillo asserts a claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a. This statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons
[are] . . . entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
2
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facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(a). The following establishments are considered “a place of
public accommodation” if it serves the public: inns, hotels, motels, any “other
establishment which provides lodging to transient guests,” restaurants,
cafeterias lunchroom, lunch counters, soda fountains, any “other facility”
selling food for consumptions on the “the premises, theaters, concert halls,
sports arenas, stadiums, any “other place of exhibition or entertainment.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(3). 1 In addition, any establishment that is “physically
located within the premises” of the above-enumerated establishments is
covered by the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(4).
Martillo has failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a because
the defendants’ social media platforms are not places of “public
accommodation.” The statutory definition of a “public accommodation”
cannot be interpreted to include a virtual meeting place. The definition
enumerates only actual physical establishments and structures (e.g., hotels,
restaurants, movie theaters, stadiums) and establishments “physically

In addition, the operations of the establishment must “affect commerce” or
the discrimination must be “supported by State action.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(b).

1
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located” within the aforesaid. Read in tandem with the enumerated “places
of public accommodation,” the statute’s reference to any “other place of
exhibition or entertainment,” does not include a virtual meeting place. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Google LLC, 851 App’x 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that
YouTube websites are not a “place of public accommodation” within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261
F. Supp. 2d 532, 541-42 (E.D. Va.) (holding that internet chat room was not
a “public accommodation” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)
because places of “‘public accommodation’ are limited to actual physical
places and structures, and thus cannot include chat rooms, which are not
actual physical facilities but instead are virtual forms for communication”)
see also Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2016)
(reiterating “the uncontroversial premise that, where feasible, ‘a statute
should be construed in a way that conforms to the plain meaning of its text’”)
(quoting In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995))). 2

Martillo’s reliance on cases concerning the definition of a “public
accommodation” in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act is
misplaced. See Lewis v. Google LLC, 461 F. Supp. 3d 938, 957 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (stating that “the ADA has a more expansive definition of ‘place of
public accommodation’ than the Civil Rights Act”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
2
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Martillo also claims that the defendants violated a Massachusetts
common carrier law which provides that “[e]very common carrier of
merchandise or other property” “shall not discriminate against any
particular person or subject him to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage.” M.G.L. ch. 159, § 1. The defendants are not common carriers
of “merchandise or other property” for purposes of this 1869 law. See Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. IMR Cap. Corp., 888 F. Supp. 221 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting
year of enactment of M.G.L. ch. 159, § 1).
Further, even if Martillo had stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a or
the state common carrier law, the defendants would be immune from such
claims under the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.
The CDA provides in relevant part: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of . . . any action taken to
enable or make available to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material” “that the provider or user
considers to be lewd, lascivious, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). This provision “‘precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role,’
and therefore bars ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its
5
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exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content.’” Green v. America
Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir.1997)). The defendants’ alleged
blocking of content posted by Martillo and disabling of his account are
editorial decisions protected by the CDA. See, e.g., Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v.
Facebook, 697 Fed. App’x 526, 526 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that, under the
CDA, Facebook was immune from claim that it had wrongly blocked the
plaintiff’s online content); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d, 622,
631 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that the CDA “provides Google, Yahoo, and
Microsoft immunity for their editorial decisions regarding screening and
deletion [of the plaintiff’s advertisements] from their network”) (footnote
omitted).
ORDER
In accordance with the foregoing, the motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Richard G. Stearns
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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